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DOMESTIC LAW
I. SUPREME COURT DEFINES FOUR CRITERIA FOR RESOLVING PARENT-
THIRD PARTY CUSTODY DISPUTES
In Moore v. Moore1 the South Carolina Supreme Court defines
four criteria for courts to apply to resolve custody disputes between a
child's natural parents and third parties who have had temporary cus-
tody of the minor child. The four criteria are (1) the present fitness of
the natural parent, (2) the amount of contact between the child and
the natural parent, (3) the circumstances surrounding the natural par-
ent's temporary relinquishment of custody, and (4) the degree of at-
tachment between the child and the temporary custodian.2 Although
the court in Moore presents a new test, two established principles of
South Carolina law, promoting the best interests of the child and rec-
ognizing the superior rights of natural parents in custody disputes,
guided the supreme court.3 The court cites cases from other jurisdic-
tions and South Carolina to support the formulation of its guidelines in
Moore.
4
When Michael Moore and his wife separated in 1983, Mr. Moore
received custody of their five children. He then moved his family to
Georgetown so that his parents could assist in caring for the children.
Mr. and Mrs. Jessie Sanders offered to care for Shawn, one of Mr.
Moore's children. Shawn was two years old in 1984 when his physical
custody was transferred to the Sanders. Furthermore, the Moores' final
divorce decree included an agreement to maintain the physical place-
ment of Shawn with the Sanders "until no longer feasible," but Mr.
Moore retained permanent legal custody of Shawn.'
Initially, Shawn had frequent contact with his father and siblings,
and in 1984 Mr. Moore provided for Shawn's day care and medical
insurance. Injuries he sustained in a car accident, however, hampered
Mr. Moore's ability to provide for Shawn. In March 1985, after a mili-
tary transfer to Alabama, Moore attempted to regain physical custody
of Shawn, but the Sanders convinced him to wait until he was settled
1. 300 S.C. 75, 386 S.E.2d 456 (1989).
2. Id. at 79-80, 386 S.E.2d at 458.
3. Id. at 78-79, 386 S.E.2d at 458.
4. See id. at 79-80, 386 S.E.2d at 458.. See generally Annotation, Right of Parent
to Regain Custody of Child After Temporary Conditional Relinquishment of Custody,
35 A.L.R.4th 61 (1985).
5. Moore, 300 S.C. at 77, 386 S.E.2d at 457.
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in Alabama. On his subsequent visits to Georgetown, Mr. Moore con-
tinued to have contact with Shawn. After an incident with Shawn's
mother in December 1985, however, Mr. and Mrs. Sanders refused to
allow Mr. Moore to visit Shawn unless they were present.
Mr. Moore remarried in November 1986, and in December he
made another attempt to regain physical custody of Shawn. The Sand-
ers, however, refused to give up physical custody of Shawn. Therefore,
in July 1987 Mr. Moore requested a rule to show cause why an order
should not be issued to allow him to remove Shawn from the Sanders'
home. At the final hearing the trial court transferred permanent cus-
tody of Shawn to the Sanders because of Shawn's bonding with them,
and because Mr. Moore had "abandoned" Shawn.6 The supreme court,
however, applied the four-part test and reversed the custody award.7
Under the first element of the test a natural parent must establish
that he is presently fit and able to care properly for the child.8 A rebut-
table presumption that it is in the best interest of the child to be in the
custody of the natural parent arises once the natural parent establishes
fitness."
Although granting custody to a fit parent seems to promote the
best interests of the child, South Carolina courts have looked to factors
other than fitness when they favored a third party over a parent.10
These cases, however, often contain an implicit finding of unfitness,
which leaves in doubt the circumstances under which other considera-
tions will rebut the presumption in favor of a fit natural parent over a
third party.11 The test adopted by the supreme court in Moore clarifies
this gray area by delineating specific factors for the trial court to con-
sider when it resolves a custody dispute between a parent and third
party.
Moore asserted that in Kay v. Rowland" the supreme court cre-
ated an irrebuttable presumption in favor of fit parents by holding that
"Once the natural parent is deemed fit, the issue of custody is de-
6. Id. at 80, 386 S.E.2d at 458.
7. Id. at 81, 386 S.E.2d at 459.
8. Id. at 79, 386 S.E.2d at 458.
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Cook v. Cobb, 271 S.C. 136, 245 S.E.2d. 612 (1978) (bond between
child and temporary custodian established during custody of almost five years); Driggers
v. Hayes, 264 S.C. 69, 212 S.E.2d. 579 (1975) (bonding, religious training, custody for
over ten years); Koon v. Koon, 203 S.C. 556, 28 S.E.2d 89.(1943) (financial ability and
proximity to school and church).
11. See, e.g., Cook, 271 S.C. at 136, 245 S.E.2d at 612 (mother would not provide
good environment for child); Koon, 203 S.C. at 556, 28 S.E.2d at 89 (father boarding with
friends, home only at night).
12. 285 S.C. 516, 331 S.E.2d 781 (1985).
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cided."' 3 If the court had applied this standard in Moore, the trial
court would have had no authority to award custody to the Sanders
because the evidence established Moore's fitness. Rowland is distin-
guishable, however, because in that case the third party was the child's
maternal grandmother who did not have custody, but, nevertheless, in-
tervened in the child's parents' divorce hearing on the issue of
custody.
14
Even if Rowland creates an irrebuttable presumption in favor of a
fit parent under its facts, the court in Moore does not extend the ir-
rebuttable presumption to custody disputes between natural parents
and the third parties who have temporary custody of the child.' 5 Giv-
ing fit parents an absolute right to custody may be contrary to the
child's best interests when an established and stable relationship exists
with the third party who seeks custody.' The court, therefore, recog-
nizes only a rebuttable presumption in favor of the natural parent, and
this rebuttable presumption may be overcome not only by showing
that the parent is unfit, but also by the amount of contact between the
parent and the child, by the circumstances behind the temporary relin-
quishment, and by the bond between the child and temporary
custodian.17
The Moore court relaxed the irrebuttable presumption outlined in
Rowland. The Rowland decision is, nevertheless, significant because it
apparently influenced the court in Moore to develop a relatively strin-
gent burden for third parties to meet.'8
Another element of the test is the circumstances under which the
parent relinquished custody of the child.' 9 The Moore court addresses
only temporary relinquishment. Other jurisdictions additionally have
been willing to allow a parent to regain custody of a child when the
parent's initial relinquishment of custody grew out of concern for the
child's welfare. For example, a parent's inability to care properly for
the child may justify the relinquishment.0 The Moore opinion implic-
13. Id. at 517, 331 S.E.2d at 782.
14. Id. n.1, 331 S.E.2d at 781 n.1.
15. 300 S.C. at 79, 386 S.E.2d at 458 (citing Rowland as support for a rebuttable
presumption standard).
16. See McGough & Shindell, Coming of Age: The Best Interests of the Child
Standard In Parent-Third Party Custody Disputes, 27 EMORY L.J. 209, 216 (1978).
17. 300 S.C. at 79-80, 386 S.E.2d at 458.
18. Id. at 79, 386 S.E.2d at 458.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Hamm v. Hamm, 207 Kan. 431, 485 P.2d 221 (1971) (mother receiving
no support from father and unable to provide for children); State ex rel. Britton v. Bry-
ant, 95 Neb. 129, 145 N.W. 266 (1914) (mother required hospitalization); Carter v. Carter,
653 P.2d 207 (Okla. 1982)(child developed illness requiring treatment custodial parent
could not provide).
1990]
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itly supports this proposition when it expresses the court's desire to
ensure "that parents who temporarily relinquish custody for the child's
best interest can regain custody when conditions become more
favorable."" I The class of parents that benefit from this factor is de-
fined narrowly as those who in good faith temporarily relinquish cus-
tody for the best interests of the child.
When he relinquished custody of Shawn, Moore was experiencing
difficulties trying to cope as a single father rearing five children.22 The
Sanders suggested the custody arrangement to help him.2 3 The parties
intended the custody arrangement to be temporary.2 4 Implicit in this
arrangement was a good faith requirement for the temporary custodian
to respect the rights of the natural parent and not take advantage of
their custody of the child.25 The supreme court observed that "Child
custody should not be subject to change because of adverse posses-
sion."'26 This statement demonstrates the court's concern that a parent
be able to regain custody after he relinquishes possession of the child
in good faith.
A third element of the court's test is "[t]he amount of contact, in
the form of visits, financial support or both, which the parent had with
the child while it was in the care of a third party. '27 Contacts must,
however, be evaluated with regard to all of the circumstances. In
Moore the supreme court found that Moore had maintained sufficient
contact to justify an award of custody to him.
The court will examine the actions of the temporary custodians in
21. 300 S.C. at 79, 386 S.E.2d at 458. When a party seeks to upset custody, the
court requires that party to show a change of conditions that materially affects the wel-
fare of the child. Cook v. Cobb, 271 S.C. 136, 143, 245 S.E.2d 612, 616 (1978). Although
the supreme court has applied the change of circumstances rule to custody disputes be-
tween parents and third parties, Skinner v. King, 272 S.C. 520, 252 S.E.2d 891 (1979), its
continued application is inappropriate in the situations Moore v. Moore addresses. When
custody is determined for the first time, a temporary custodian may be in an unfairly
advantageous position if the natural parent is less financially stable and would, therefore,
be unable to show that a change of custody would materially benefit the child. Funk-
houser v. Funkhouser, 158 W. Va., 964, 968, 216 S.E.2d 570, 573 (1975). In situations like
Moore, in which the parent has legal custody of the child, however, the burden is on the
temporary custodianto establish any change of conditions that materially affects the
welfare of the child. See Cook, 271 S.C. at 143, 245 S.E.2d at 616. Nevertheless, rather
than applying the change of circumstances standard in Cook, the court adopted this test
to resolve parent-third party custody disputes.
22. Brief of Appellant at 2.
23. Id.
24. Moore, 300 S.C. at 81, 386 S.E.2d at 459.
25. See id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 79, 386 S.E.2d at 459.
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its evaluation of the contacts between a natural parent and child.28 Mr.
and Mrs. Sanders unilaterally restricted Moore's contact with Shawn
when they refused his offers of financial assistance and only allowed
visitation in their presence after December 1985.29 Even though
Moore's contact may have been limited, the court found that it was
sufficient under the circumstances. Thus, the court will. balance the
lack of contact by the parent with actions of the third party to limit
contact between the parent and child. Because the Sanders attempted
to limit Moore's contact with Shawn, however, the Moore court did not
offer any guidelines to determine what is sufficient contact when third
party intervention is not a factor.
The final element courts are to consider under the Moore test is
the degree of attachment between the temporary custodian and the
child.30 This has been an influential factor in previous South Carolina
cases in which the courts have awarded custody to a third party.3 1 In
Moore, however, the court held this to be only one consideration and
that the existence of a psychological parent-child relationship is insuf-
ficient to deny custody to the natural parent.3 2 The court does not ex-
plain what manner of relationship will suffice to deny custody to the
natural parent, but the previous standard is whether severing the rela-
tionship will harm the child.3 3 Shawn was two years old in 1984 when
custody was transferred to the Sanders, and he lived with them about
four years. The guardian ad litem determined that the child had
bonded with Mr. and Mrs. Sanders as his mother and father, and had
not had sufficient contact with Moore to maintain a relationship." The
court, however, found this unpersuasive in light of Mr. and Mrs. Sand-
ers' actions to prevent the development of a normal relationship be-
tween Mr. Moore and Shawn. 5 Although custody should not be
awarded to punish or reward a party,3" the court's displeasure with the
Sanders undoubtedly influenced its decision to award custody to
28. See id. at 81, 386 S.E.2d at 459.
29. Id. at 77-78, 386 S.E.2d at 457. The cases cited by the court in support of this
factor also indicate concern with third party intervention. In People ex rel. Bukovic v.
Smith, 98 Ill. App. 3d 144, 148, 423 N.E.2d 1302, 1305 (1981), the grandparents refused
to allow the parent contact, and in Brown v. Ellison, 162 So. 2d 805, 806 (La. Ct. App.
1964), the custodians threatened to shoot the mother if she came to their house.
30. 300 S.C. at 80, 386 S.E.2d at 458.
31. See Cook v. Cobb, 271 S.C. 136, 245 S.E.2d 612 (1978) (child regarded grand-
parents as parent figures); Driggers v. Hayes, 264 S.C. 69, 212 S.E.2d 579 (1975) (best
interest of child to remain in home where she would receive love and religious training).
32. 300 S.C. at 80, 386 S.E.2d at 459.
33. See Cook, 271 S.C. at 142, 245 S.E.2d at 615.
34. Brief of Guardian Ad Litem at 5-6.
35. 300 S.C. at 80, 386 S.E.2d at 459.
36. See Davenport v. Davenport, 265 S.C. 524, 220 S.E.2d 228 (1975).
1990]
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Moore.
The supreme court designed this test to ensure that parents who
relinquish custody in good faith may regain custody when conditions
become more favorable. Although third parties are not precluded from
successfully challenging custody, it will be difficult for them to over-
come the presumption that the natural parents should have custody of
their children. The court's opinion in Moore benefits both litigants and
trial courts by stating the factors for courts to consider when they re-
solve parent-third party custody disputes. Nevertheless, the decision
leaves undefined .the standard to apply when no intervening acts by
the third party are a factor.
Lorie L. Maring
II. COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE INFERRED FROM PARTIES' CONDUCT
In Prevatte v. Prevatte37 the South Carolina Court of Appeals held
that a common-law marriage exists when a legal impediment to the
marriage has been removed, even though the couple is unaware of the
impediment's removal. When the parties appear to agree that they are
married, their knowledge of the impediment's removal is "of no conse-
quence, under the circumstances."38
Mr. and Mrs. Prevatte were married ceremonially, but not legally,
in 1959. At that time, Mrs. Prevatte was legally married to Allard
Owens. 9 The Prevattes lived together as husband and wife for twenty-
five years. They had a child which they raised to adulthood. They held
themselves out to the public as husband and wife; they filed joint tax
returns and Mr. Prevatte carried insurance on Mrs. Prevatte as his
wife. In 1985 Mrs. Prevatte filed an action for divorce from her com-
mon-law husband, Mr. Prevatte, on grounds of adultery. 0 Both parties
were aware of Mrs. Prevatte's marriage to Owens. Mr. Prevatte, how-
ever, contended at trial that he thought that Mrs. Prevatte had di-
37. 297 S.C. 345, 377 S.E.2d 114 (Ct. App. 1989).
38. Id. at 350, 377 S.E.2d at 117.
39. Id. at 347, 377 S.E.2d at 116.
40. The case reached the court of appeals on appeal from an order of the family
court. The family court had reaffirmed its prior order, which found that a common-law
marriage existed between the parties, and the family court granted Mrs. Prevatte a di-
vorce on the grounds of adultery. During the proceedings, which resulted in the first
order, Mr. Prevatte attacked the validity of the divorce decree that ended Mrs.
Prevatte's marriage to Allard Owens. The family court held that Mr. Prevatte did not
have standing to attack the decree. The court of appeals reversed. The family court, on
remand, considered and rejected the attack on the divorce decree.
[Vol. 42
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vorced Owens.
41
In 1977 Owens obtained a divorce decree from Mrs. Prevatte in
Florence County. He served notice of the divorce on Mrs. Prevatte by
publication. Neither she nor Mr. Prevatte became aware of the Owens
diVorce until 1985. Mrs. Prevatte previously had filed for a divorce
from Mr. Prevatte in 1983 and in 1984, and in the 1984 action Mr.
Prevatte admitted that they were married."' The trial judge held that a
common-law marriage existed between them and granted Mrs.
Prevatte a divorce. The court of appeals affirmed. 43 Prevatte signifi-
cantly impacts South Carolina law for two reasons: (1) the court found
that a common-law marriage existed without either party knowing that
the impediment to their marriage (Mrs. Prevatte's earlier marriage)
had been removed; and (2) the court held that Mr. Prevatte hqd com-
mitted adultery based on minimal circumstantial evidence of his dispo-
sition to commit the offense.
Although common-law marriage has been recognized by American
courts since 1809, 44 it is on the decline in the United States.45 Thirteen
states and the District of Columbia currently recognize common-law
marriage. 4 Black's Law Dictionary defines the relationship as a mar-
riage "not solemnized in the ordinary way (i.e. non-ceremonial) but
created by an agreement to marry, followed by cohabitation. A con-
summated agreement to marry, between persons legally capable of
making [a] marriage contract, per verba de praesenti, followed by
cohabitation.""
An essential element of a common-law marriage is a present agree-
ment between the parties to enter a marital relationship. The parties
also must have the legal capacity to marry. Most jurisdictions require
41. Record at 77.
42. Prevatte, 297 S.C. at 348, 377 S.E.2d at 116.
43. Id. at 354, 377 S.E.2d at 119. The court of appeals also addressed several other
issues. Mr. Prevatte attacked the validity of the divorce decree obtained by Owens in
1977. Mr. Prevatte argued that the court which issued the decree had no jurisdiction
over Mrs. Prevatte and that service by publication was improper. The court found that
in the absence of fraud or collusion (which were not alleged by Mr. Prevatte), the deci-
sion of an officer issuing a publication is final. The court of appeals upheld the lower
court's award to Mrs. Prevatte of an equitable interest in marital property because no
abuse of discretion could be shown. The court also rejected challenges to the awarding of
alimony and attorney fees. Id. at 348-54, 377 S.E.2d at 116-19.
44. Kirkpatrick, Common-Law Marriages: Their Common Law Basis and Present
Need, 6 ST. Louis U.L.J. 30 (1960).
45. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 2.4, at 45
(2d ed. 1988).
46. Id. at 46-47. The states are Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas,
Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Texas.
47. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 251 (5th ed. 1979).
1990]
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that the couple consummate the relationship by cohabitation or mu-
tual assumption of marital duties4s and that the public recognize their
marital status.' Parties must "hold themselves out as married" to pre-
vent fraudulent claims, which could be made if only an agreement were
required.50 The general rule among states that recognize common-law
marriages is that when persons attempt to marry but are unable to
enter a valid relationship because of a legal impediment, and that im-
pediment is subsequently removed, the relationship ripens into a com-
mon-law marriage.81 This rule usually has been followed by the courts
when one or both of the parties has acted in good faith and in igno-
rance of the impediment.5 2 In South Carolina, however, a relationship
which is illicit at its inception does not ripen into a valid common-law
marriage upon removal of the legal impediment. South Carolina law
presumes that the relationship retains its illicit character. For a com-
mon-law marriage to arise, the parties must show that they entered a
new marriage agreement after the impediment's removal.
5 3
Early decisions hinged on the agreement requirement and the in-
tent of the parties. In Davis v. Whitlock54 the supreme court held that
a lawful marriage existed between two parties when neither knew that
the wife's first husband was still living. In Bannister v. Bannister,55
however, a man married a second woman although he knew that his
first wife was alive. He continued to live with his second wife after the
first wife's death. Because the husband lacked good faith when he en-
tered the second marriage, and because the couple did not enter into a
new agreement after the first wife's death, the supreme court found
that the "meretricious" relationship continued and, thus, no common-
law marriage existed. In Lemon v. Lemon5 7 the supreme court again
held that a relationship was unlawful, despite the parties' continued
cohabitation after the death of the wife's first husband, because there
was no evidence of a subsequent agreement to marry or that the par-
ties acted in the belief that they were "capable of entering into a mar-
riage relation."58
48. 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 19(b)(1) (1948).
49. H. CLARK, supra note 45, § 2.4, at 48.
50. See id.
51. 52 AM. JuR. 2D Marriage § 58 (1970) (an example of a legal impediment is the
existence of an undissolved prior marriage).
52. Id.
53. See Lemon v. Lemon, 158 S.C. 71, 76, 155 S.E. 285, 287 (1930); Bannister v.
Bannister, 150 S.C. 411, 414, 148 S.E. 228, 229 (1929).
54. 90 S.C. 233, 73 S.E. 171 (1911).
55. 150 S.C. 411, 148 S.E. 228 (1929).
56. Id. at 414, 148 S.E. at 229.
57. 158 S.C. 71, 155 S.E. 285 (1930).
58. Id. at 76, 155 S.E. at 287.
[Vol. 42
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Recent South Carolina cases have relaxed the agreement require-
ment and have focused on the conduct of the parties as evidence of a
common-law marriage. In Kirby v. Kirby59 the court decided whether
the couple intended to enter a new marital agreement from their con-
duct. In Kirby the court decided that a valid common-law marriage
existed even though no new agreement was made. The wife obtained a
divorce from her first husband during the parties' cohabitation, and
they continued to live together for sixteen years as husband and wife."0
In Yarbrough v. Yarbrough6' the court of appeals stated that after the
removal of the impediment to lawful marriage the parties must enter a
new agreement, "though such agreement may be gathered from the
conduct of the parties."
' 2
In Prevatte the husband challenged the trial judge's holding that
the parties were married. Mr. Prevatte argued that he and Mrs.
Prevatte could not have entered into a new marital agreement after
Owens obtained his 1977 divorce from Mrs. Prevatte unless the couple
knew of the divorce.6 3 The court expressly declined to decide whether
knowledge of the impediment's removal was a prerequisite to the for-
mation of a new agreement between the parties.6 Instead, the court
inferred that an agreement was made because the parties lived as hus-
band and wife for more than twenty-five years. In 1984 both parties
represented to the court that they were married. Because the impedi-
ment actually had been removed by 1984, the court held that the
Prevattes had a common-law marriage."
The Prevatte opinion represents a reasonable shift by the courts
from requiring an express agreement as evidence of a common-law
marriage to inferring one from the parties' conduct, especially in light
of the public policy considerations that underlie the common-law mar-
riage concept. Courts considered an agreement critical evidence to
prove a common-law marriage in early cases. Courts recognized then
that parties which lived as husband and wife often were unable to
marry legally because of difficulties in travelling to obtain a license or
in participating in a ceremony. An agreement would be a suitable sub-
stitute to prove marriage. "Today, if common law marriage can be jus-
tified at all, it is as a means of making good the bona fide expectations
59. 270 S.C. 137, 241 S.E.2d 415 (1978).
60. Id. at 141-42, 241 S.E.2d at 416.
61. 280 S.C. 546, 314 S.E.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1984).
62. Id. at 551, 314 S.E.2d at 19.
63. Mr. Prevatte also contended that Mrs. Prevatte entered into the marriage in
bad faith because she knew that she was still married to Owens when she married Mr.
Prevatte. Record at 6-7. The court of appeals did not address the bad faith argument.
64. Prevatte, 297 S.C. at 349, 377 S.E.2d at 117.
65. Id. at 350, 377 S.E.2d at 117.
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of parties."6 0
Although the court of appeals expressly declined to decide
whether knowledge of the impediment's removal was necessary for the
parties to have entered a subsequent agreement, the decision in
Prevatte suggests that knowledge of the impediment's removal is not a
prerequisite. The court of appeals focused on the parties' conduct as
evidence of their agreement to live as husband and wife. In acknowl-
edging the Prevattes' agreement, the court imputed knowledge of the
impediment's removal to the couple.
Prevatte follows the trend in South Carolina to infer an agreement
from the parties' conduct. The opinion, however, raises a question
about why the court did not adopt expressly the view that courts
should not require the parties' knowledge of the impediment's removal
to have a common-law marriage. Perhaps the court chose not to reject
the requirement of a new agreement, but took a reasonable course
given the circumstances by holding that the Prevattes were married.
The court also gave great weight to Mr. Prevatte's admission of
marriage in the 1984 action.17 Mr. Prevatte contended at trial that he
believed Mrs. Prevatte was divorced when he married her. In fact, he
did not learn of the Owens divorce decree until late 1985. Thus, Mr.
Prevatte's belief that he was married in 1984 seems reasonable. The
court, however, adopted "essentially the same facts as those found by
the trial judge" and concluded that both Mr. and Mrs. Prevatte knew
that she was married to Mr. Owens. 8
Mr. Prevatte also challenged the trial judge's grant of divorce be-
cause of adultery. Prevatte argued that the evidence of his adultery
was "circumstantial and inconclusive."'69 The court dismissed this argu-
ment. Witnesses at trial testified that Mr. Prevatte was seen with an-
other woman in remote locatins on two occasions. Mrs. Prevatte testi-
fied that she had suspected that her husband was engaged in an
adulterous relationship. Based on this evidence, the court of appeals
stated that it was "fully convinced" that adultery occurred.
7 0
To support a charge of adultery the evidence must show both that
the party had the opportunity and the disposition to commit the of-
fense.71 Direct evidence is not necessary. Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient to prove adultery if that evidence establishes (1) the opportu-
nity to commit the adultery, (2) an adulterous inclination in the mind
66. H. CLARK, supra note 45, § 2.4, at 50-51.
67. See Prevatte, 297 S.C. at 348, 377 S.E.2d at 116.
68. Id. at 347, 377 S.E.2d at 116.
69. Id. at 350, 377 S.E.2d at 117.
70. Id. at 352, 377 S.E.2d at 119.
71. 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 193(b) (1986).
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of the party charged with the offense, and (3) no reasonable explana-
tion for the suspicious conduct other than guilt.72
In South Carolina a party may prove adultery by circumstantial
evidence as a ground for divorce. The standard of proof required by
South Carolina courts, however, is changing. In Brown v. Brown"3 the
court stated that, "[t]he proof of adultery. . . must be clear and posi-
tive, and the infidelity must be established by a clear preponderance of
the evidence.. . . [I]f after due consideration of all, the evidence the
proof of guilt is inconclusive, a divorce will be denied. 174 In DuBose v.
DuBose,75 however, the court held that although proof of adultery
must be "sufficiently definite to identify the time and place of the of-
fense and the circumstances under which it was committed.. . . Insuf-
ficiency in this respect. . . should not be allowed to defeat a divorce
where the Court is fully convinced that adultery has, in fact, been com-
mitted . . .71
The mere association of two people is not enough to prove adul-
tery. 1 In Fox v. Fox75 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
although the evidence had placed the husband and a third party to-
gether, "that fact alone, without more, does not warrant the conclusion
that adultery was committed.'179 Relying on Fox the court of appeals in
Fulton v. Fulton" found that although evidence that a wife and a third
party had spent the night in a house with another couple on three dif-
ferent occasions might be sufficient to establish an opportunity to com-
mit adultery, it was not sufficient to establish a disposition toward
adulterous behavior."'
In view of the standards set by South Carolina courts, strong evi-
dence of Mr. Prevatte's disposition to commit adultery did not exist.
Trial testimony revealed Prevatte's opportunity to commit adultery
when it placed him alone in remote locations with another woman. The
court of appeals chose to infer Mr. Prevatte's disposition from the cir-
cumstancial evidence. The court noted that "[t]he same evidence
which proves the opportunity can prove the disposition."82 The
72. 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adultery § 3 (1962).
73. 215 S.C. 502, 56 S.E.2d 330 (1949).
74. Id. at 512-13, 56 S.E.2d at 335 (citations omitted).
75. 259 S.C. 418, 192 S.E.2d 329 (1972).
76. Id. at 423, 192 S.E.2d at 331.
77. 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 193(b) (1986).
78. 277 S.C. 400, 288 S.E.2d 390 (1982).
79. Id. at 402, 288 S.E.2d at 391.
80. 293 S.C. 146, 359 S.E.2d 88 (Ct. App. 1987).
81. Id. at 147, 359 S.E.2d at 89. But see Anders v. Anders, 285 S.C. 512, 331 S.E.2d
340 (1985) (circumstantial evidence that wife spent time in another man's apartment
sufficient to support finding of adultery).
82. Prevatte, 297 S.C. at 352, 377 S.E.2d at 118.
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Prevatte decision extends the DuBose insufficiency of proof standard
and lowers the threshold of proof for disposition to commit adultery.
The court concluded: "[N]ot having been born yesterday, [the trial
judge] was fully convinced that Mr. Prevatte had committed adultery.
So are we."83
The Prevattes' cohabitation for over twenty years met the com-
mon-law marriage standard. The Prevattes also held themselves out as
husband and wife. The court's decision is reasonable and is consistent
with public policy considerations that favor marriage over concubi-
nage.84 The court's ruling on adultery, however, lowers the standard of
proof almost to one in which mere association is sufficient. This is a
dangerous precedent and one that few states would follow.
Laura Elizabeth Cude
III. ENGLISH RULE APPLIED TO DETERMINE THE CHARACTER OF
ANTENUPTIAL GIFTS
In Pappas v. Pappas"5 the South Carolina Court of Appeals held
that when a marriage is dissolved and the intent of a donor who gave
an antenuptial gift cannot be established, South Carolina courts should
apply the English rule8" when distributing the gift. Under the English
rule a court presumes that the donor gave the gift to the person to
whom he is most closely related.8 7 By adopting the English rule, the
court of appeals specifically rejected the New York rule which consid-
ers the character of the property to determine ownership, even though
in most situations the New York rule would lead to the same result as
the English rule. 8
83. Id.
84. Annotation, Inferehce or presumption of marriage from continued cohabita-
tion following removal of impediment, 104 A.L.R. 6, 32-33 (1936).
85. 300 S.C. 62, 386 S.E.2d 301 (Ct. App. 1989).
86. See Samson v. Samson, [1960] 1 All E.R. 653. The English rule is that if evi-
dence exists of the donor's intent, then intent determines ownership. When the donor's
intent is not clear, the court may infer that gifts from the wife's friends and family were
intended for her and gifts from the husband's friends and family were intended for him.
Id. at 656.
87. Id.
88. The New York rule presumes that all gifts of general household use were in-
tended to be joint property, while all peculiar personal gifts were intended to be the
separate property of the user of such property. See Avnet v. Avnet, 204 Misc. 760, 763,
124 N.Y.S.2d 517, 524 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. 1953):
All wedding gifts whether from the bride's 'side' or from the groom's, excepting
such items which are peculiarly adaptable to the personal use of either spouse,
and those gifts which are specifically and unequivocally 'earmarked' as in-
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The Pappas case arose out of a couple's divorce and subsequent
dispute over ownership of a sterling silver flatware set. Mrs. Pappas'
grandmother gave the couple the gift prior to the wedding. The silver
had been delivered to the home of Mrs. Pappas' parents and was dis-
played with the other wedding gifts. Mr. Pappas claimed that the sil-
ver was a wedding gift to both parties, and had been transmuted into
marital property upon their marriage. Thus, as marital property, it was
subject to equitable apportionment. Mrs. Pappas, however, asserted
that the silver was a personal gift to her from her grandmother and the
gift was not a wedding gift subject to distribution. The family court
ruled that the grandmother had intended the silver to be a personal
gift solely for the benefit of Mrs. Pappas. Consequently, the family
court held that the silver was Mrs. Pappas' property and Mr. Pappas
had no interest in it. Mr. Pappas appealed the family court's ruling. 9
The court of appeals held that because of the Pappas' conflicting,
unconvincing, and self-serving testimony in the family court, the evi-
dence was insufficient to establish the deceased grandmother's intent.
The court of appeals noted that the South Carolina Supreme Court
had not yet adopted a rule regarding antenuptial gifts and chose to
adopt the English rule.90
The South Carolina Code defines marital property as "all real and
personal property which has been acquired by the parties during the
marriage .... ."91 Property acquired before marriage by either party
specifically is excluded from marital property by the South Carolina
Equitable Apportionment Act.9 2 Because the silver was an antenuptial
gift, it could not have been marital property unless Mrs. Pappas'
grandmother intended it to be a joint gift to the couple.9 3 Joint gifts
are transmuted into marital property upon the couple's marriage, and
thus are subject to equitable distribution. By contrast, separate gifts to
the bride and groom retain their independent status throughout the
marriage and are not subject to equitable distribution unless trans-
muted into .marital property during the marriage. Transmutation is a
tended exclusively for the one or the other of the spouses, commonly intended
for general use in the household, are the joint property of both parties to the
marriage.
Id.; see also Rapkin v. Israel, 88 Pa. D. & C. 20 (1953). "Wedding gifts not of a personal
nature are held by the husband and wife as tenants by the entireties." Id. at 27.
89. Pappas, 300 S.C. at 63, 386 S.E.2d at 302-03.
90. Id. at 65, 386 S.E.2d at 303.
91. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-473 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
92. Id. § 20-7-473(2).
93. I. BAXTER, MARITAL PROPERTY § 31:1 (1973); see also Samson v. Samson, [1960]
1 All E.R. 653 (rejects proposition that wedding presents are joint property to both
spouses).
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matter of intent and is demonstrated by the parties' use of the item in
support of the marriage. 4
The donor's intent is the key element in determining the status of
the gift. If the evidence clearly establishes the donor's intent, then the
donor's intent decides the ownership of the antenuptial gift. If the tes-
timony of the parties is conflicting or self-serving, however, the trier of
fact must determine to whom the donor intended to give the gift.
Under the English rule, courts look at the origin of the gift, and infer
from the relationship of the donor and donee that the donor intended
the gift to be the separate property of the person to whom the donor
was most closely related.95 For example, if a friend or relative of the
bride gave the couple the gift, a court that applied the English rule
would presume that the donor. had intended the gift to be for the
bride. The court would consider the gift to be the separate property of
the bride and, therefore, would not distribute the gift as marital prop-
erty upon divorce.
When it rejected the New York rule,95 the court of appeals rea-
soned that the English rule was more objective, and that intent usually
could be proven without evaluating the credibility of the witnesses.
9 7
The English rule's presumption that the donor intended the gift to be
the separate property of the person to whom he is most closely related,
however, is rebuttable. For example, a party can rebut the presump-
tion under the English rule if the donor testifies about his intent
against his friend or relative. The court of appeals reasoned that under
the New York rule, by contrast, a close relationship between the donor
and the recipient might be more likely to cause the donor's testimony
to be biased."8
By adopting the English rule in South Carolina, the court of ap-
peals has attempted to better effectuate the donor's intent. The Eng-
lish rule's assumption that the donor intends his gift to belong to the
94. Pappas, 300 S.C. at 66, 386 S.E.2d at 304.
95. See Samson, [1960] 1 All E.R. at 656 (when intent not found court may infer
that gifts from the wife's family are to the wife and gifts from the husband's family are
to the husband); Hichens v. Hichens, [1945] 1 All E.R. 451, 453:
The matter very often comes up with regard to wedding presents, which in one
sense are given to both spouses, and very often you have to solve the matter by
saying that if a present is given by a friend of the wife or relation of the wife
the property should be given to the wife, and that it should be given to the
husband if it was a present by a relation or friend of the husband.
Id.; see also Lamb v. Hennies, 183 F.2d 852, 856 (8th Cir. 1950) (wedding gifts were not
part of the wife's property because evidence proved that the gifts were purchased by the
husband's employees, who did not know the wife before the marriage).
96. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
97. Pappas, 300 S.C. at 66, 386 S.E.2d at 304.
98. Id.
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spouse to whom he is most closely related is logical. A distribution
under the New York rule would not always achieve this purpose be-
cause general household gifts would be distributed jointly. Of course,
even under the English rule, if the gift was for general household use
and had been used as common property, it arguably would have been
transmuted into marital property. Thus, the common use of the sepa-
rate gift might lead to the equitable distribution of the gift even under
the English rule."
Marian Louise Askins
IV. LOCAL CHILD PROTECTION WORKERS OWE A SPECIAL DUTY TO
MAKE A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION INTO REPORTS OF ABUSE OR
NEGLECT
In Jensen v. South Carolina Department of Social Services'" the
South Carolina Court of Appeals held that under South Carolina's
child abuse statute a county Department of Social Services (DSS), its
officers, and its employees owe a special duty to potentially abused
children to investigate reports of abuse and remove an endangered
child from the home.'' Furthermore, the court held that official immu-
nity would not shield local DSS employees from liability when they
failed to make a thorough investigation.10 2 The court also held, how-
ever, that state DSS officials did not owe the child a special duty.1
03
The suit against DSS arose when a school teacher reported to the
Anderson County DSS her suspicion that someone was abusing Shane
Clark.'0' She suspected that Wayne Drawdy, a boyfriend of Shane's
mother, was abusing the children in the Clark home. Charie Ann Jen-
kins, a social worker, met with Shane on the day of the report. He had
unexplained bruises on his face and body. He expressed a fear of
Drawdy to Jenkins. Jenkins did not locate the Clark family to investi-
99. The husband raised the issue of transmutation of the silver. The court, how-
ever, rejected this argument because no evidence of intent existed between the spouses
to transmute the silver into marital property. Id. at 67, 386 S.E.2d at 304.
100. 297 S.C. 323, 377 S.E.2d 102 (Ct. App. 1988); see also Jensen v. Conrad, 570 F.
Supp. 91 (D.S.C. 1983) (earlier federal action dismissed for failure to assert constitution-
ally or statutorily protected right), aff'd, 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1052 (1985).
101. 297 S.C. at 330-32, 377 S.E.2d at 106-07.
102. Id. at 332-33, 377 S.E.2d at 107-08.
103. Id. at 330, 377 S.E.2d at 106.
104. South Carolina Code section 20-7-510 requires school teachers to report sus-
pected abuse or neglect to the county department of social services or to a law enforce-
ment agency. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-510(A), (C) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
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gate the case further. Three months later Jenkins and Susan Straup,
also social workers, closed the file without collecting any more informa-
tion. Approximately one month later Drawdy beat to death Shane's
brother, Michael Clark. 1 5
Karole Jensen, administratrix of Michael Clark's estate, brought
wrongful death and survival actions against both the South Carolina
and Anderson County Departments of Social Services and various offi-
cials and employees of the departments, including Jenkins and Straup.
Jensen claimed that the defendants breached duties imposed on them
by the South Carolina Child Protection Act (the Act).106 The trial
court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the actions on the
grounds that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action. 01
The court of appeals applied the "public dut3 rule" 108 when it re-
viewed the trial court's decision to dismiss the claims. The rule
presumes that the statutes that define the duties of public office do not
create a duty of general care to individuals, and, thus, the statutes can-
not support an action for negligence. 0 9 The state legislature, however,
may create a "special duty""10 to individuals that will support a cause
105. Jensen, 297 S.C. at 326-27, 377 S.E.2d at 104.
106. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-110, -480 to -560, -610, -640 to -736 (Law. Co-op. 1976
& Supp. 1989). The plaintiff's specific allegations included duties listed in sections 20-7-
640 to -660 of the Code. She alleged that the state defendants had failed (1) to forward
the full content of telephone reports of suspected abuse cases to local DSS agencies, (2)
to conduct training programs for the staff of Anderson County DSS, (3) to establish a
separate organizational unit within DSS, (4) to assign and to monitor adequately their
child protection responsibility, and (5) to provide assistance in diagnosing cases of child
abuse. Jensen, 297 S.C. at 329-30, 377 S.E.2d at 106. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-640(A)
to (C), -660(A) (Law. Co-op. 1976). The plaintiff alleged that the county defendants had
failed (1) to conduct training programs for the staff of the Anderson County DSS, (2) to
staff the office adequately with persons trained in the investigation of child abuse, (3) to
conduct an appropriate and thorough investigation, and (4) to determine properly
whether the report was "indicated" or "unfounded." 297 S.C. at 330-31, 377 S.E.2d at
106. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-650(B) to (C), -660(A) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
107. Jensen, 297 S.C. at 326, 377 S.E.2d at 104. See generally S.C.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
(dismissal for failure to state a claim).
108. Rayfield v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 297 S.C. 95, 105, 374 S.E.2d
910, 915 (Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 298 S.C. 204, 379 S.E.2d 133 (1989). The public
duty rule applies to statutes that define the duties of a public office. In "an action for
negligence based upon an alleged violation of a statute ... [the action] cannot be main-
tained if the statute... was enacted ... for a purpose other than preventing the injury
of which complaint is made." Id. (quoting Bell v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 202 S.C. 160,
174, 24 S.E.2d 177, 183 (1943)).
109. See id.
110. A statute with the essential purpose to protect identifiable individuals from a
particular harm creates a special duty. A special duty exists if:
(1) an essential purpose of the statute is to protect against a particular kind of
harm; (2) the statute, either directly or indirectly, imposes on a specific public
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of action based on negligence.11l
In its analysis of whether the defendants owed a special duty to
Michael Clark, the Jensen court divided the defendants into two
groups: (1) the statewide DSS officials, and (2) the officials and em-
ployees of the Anderson County (local) child protection agency." 2 The
court reviewed the duties imposed by the Act"s and concluded that
the state defendants owed no special duty to the deceased.1 4 The court
ruled that the DSS officials at the state level were not under any statu-
tory duty to guard against individual child abuse cases, nor did the
legislature give the local DSS authority to intervene directly to protect
individual children from abuse." 5 The court also ruled that the Act
only provides for the organization and general management of the
child protection program at the state level, and, therefore, the Act
could not support Jensen's claim for negligence against the state."6
In ruling that the trial court properly dismissed the state defend-
ants, the court of appeals refused to construe the stated purpose of the
Act as creating a special duty. 1 The Act states that "[r]ecognizing
that abused and neglected children in South Carolina need protection,
it is the purpose of this article to save them from injury and harm
... ,"111 The Act's stated purpose applies equally to both state and
local DSS officials and employees, and shows the legislature's intent to
identify and protect a particular class of persons (abused children),
rather than the general public. Michael Clark, an abused child, was in
the class of persons the legislature intended the statute to protect, but
this does not, by itself, create a special duty to him. The court re-
viewed the Act for an element of a special duty to apply, but found
none applicable to the state DSS." s
When the court of appeals applied the Act to local DSS officials
officer a duty to guard against or not to cause that harm; (3) the class of per-
sons the statute intends to protect is identifiable before the fact; (4) the plain-
tiff is a person within the protected class; (5) the public officer knows or has
reason to know of the likelihood of harm to members of the class if he fails to
do his duty; and (6) the officer is given sufficient authority to act in the circum-
stances or he undertakes to act in the exercise of his office.
Id. at 106, 374 S.E.2d at 916.
111. See id. at 105-06, 374 S.E.2d at 915-16.
112. Jensen, 297 S.C. at 328, 377 S.E.2d at 105.
113. See supra note 106.
114. 297 S.C. at 330, 377 S.E.2d at 106.
115. Id. The court focused on the second and sixth elements listed in the Rayfield
definition of a special duty. See supra note 110.
116. Jensen, 297 S.C. at 330, 377 S.E.2d at 106.
117. See Brief of Appellant at 21-23.
118. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-480 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
119. Jensen, 297 S.C. at 330, 377 S.E.2d at 106.
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and employees, however, it found the requisite elements necessary to
create a special duty.120 The Act requires local child protection agen-
cies to "commence an appropriate and thorough investigation to deter-
mine whether a report of suspected child abuse or neglect is 'indicated'
or 'unfounded.' ,,121 This section creates the duty that a local agency
has to the individual child. Furthermore, the local agency is "charged
with providing, directing or coordinating the appropriate and timely
delivery of services to children found to be abused or neglected
... .1122 This section provides the authority for the local child protec-
tion agency to intervene to protect children from further abuse. The
court of appeals found that an essential purpose of these sections of
the act is to protect abused children after their cases have been re-
ported to DSS officials. These abused children constitute an identifi-
able class. Michael Clark was a member of that class, and the local
DSS officials and employees had a duty to protect Michael from
harm.123 Based on these findings the court held that the legislature cre-
ated a special duty to potentially abused children and that this duty
could support Jensen's cause of action in negligence. 12'
Other jurisdictions have faced the issue whether child protection
legislation gives rise to privately enforceable rights. In Nelson v. Free-
man125 a district court in Missouri applied the public duty rule and
held that the Missouri child abuse statute created a duty to the public
but not to individuals. 126 The Missouri statute, like its South Carolina
counterpart, requires the local child protection agency to conduct a
thorough investigation of the reported abuse. 127 The court reasoned,
however, that the local child protection agency owed a duty to the pub-
lic to investigate, and it did not suffice to establish a specific duty to
individuals under the facts and circumstances of the case.128 Similarly,
120. Id. at 331, 377 S.E.2d at 107.
121. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-650(C) (Law. Co-op. 1976). An "indicated" report is
"supported by facts which warrant a finding that abuse is more likely than not to have
occurred." Id. § 20-7-490(M). An "unfounded" report is one "for which there is no prob-
able cause to believe that the child is abused or neglected." Id. § 20-7-490(L).
122. Id. § 20-7-650(G).
123. Jensen, 297 S.C. at 331, 377 S.E.2d at 106-07. Based on these findings, the
court held that a special duty existed and, thereby, rebutted the presumption of the
public duty rule. See supra note 110.
124. Jensen, 297 S.C. at 331-32, 377 S.E.2d at 107.
125. 537 F. Supp. 602 (W.D. Mo. 1982), afj'd sub nom. Nelson ex rel. Wharton v.
Missouri Div. of Family Servs., 706 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1983).
126. Id. at 607-11.
127. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.145(6) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
128. Nelson, 537 F. Supp. at 611. In this case a child died from sexual abuse after
several reports had been made. The investigators failed to examine and follow up any of
the reports. Id. at 603-05.
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the court in Rittscher v. State 29 held that the Iowa child protection
statutes did not create the right to a private damage action against
public officials.130 The plaintiff in Rittscher, however, based the cause
of action on the theory that "any aggrieved person" had a private
cause of action under the state's child abuse statutes.131 The court re-
jected this argument and interpreted the entire statutory section to
provide a private right of action only to those persons that are injured
by wrongful dissemination or receipt of child abuse information.
132
Other jurisdictions, however, have held that child abuse statutes
provide a private cause of action for negligence. 13 3 In Florida First Na-
tional Bank v. City of Jacksonville'" the Florida Court of Appeals
held that city employees owed a special duty to protect two children
whom they had undertaken to aid.' 35 Furthermore, the court noted
that "other responsible citizens relied upon that undertaking, the mu-
nicipal employees negligently performed (or failed to perform) and
those specific children, as distinguished from the public in general,
were damaged."'3 6
In Jensen the county defendants argued that even if they owed a
duty to threatened children, they could not be held liable because of
official immunity. Official immunity shields a public officer from liabil-
ity if the performance or nonperformance of his duties is discretion-
ary.1 7 Official immunity, however, will not protect a public official if
his actions are ministerial. 38 Breach of a ministerial duty, therefore,
129. 352 N.W.2d 247 (Iowa 1984).
130. Id. at 251.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Mammo v. State, 138 Ariz. 528, 531-32, 675 P.2d 1347, 1350-51 (Ct.
App. 1983) (agency has a duty to act with reasonable care once it receives information
that concerns threatened child); Turner v. District of Columbia, 532 A.2d 662, 668-74
(D.C. 1987) (duty exists once report specifically identifying child is made); Florida First
Nat'l Bank v. City of Jacksonville, 310 So. 2d 19, 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (duty
exists if municipal employee undertakes to aid an abused child), cert. dismissed, 339 So.
2d 632 (Fla. 1976); Vonner v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 273 So. 2d 252, 255-56 (La.
1973) (duty exists and agency liable for negligently placing a child in a foster home).
134. 310 So. 2d at 19.
135. Id. at 25.
136. Id. at 27.
137. Long v. Seabrook, 260 S.C. 562, 568, 197 S.E.2d 659, 662 (1973); see McCall v.
Batson, 285 S.C. 243, 247, 329 S.E.2d 741, 743 (1985) (official immunity survives the
abrogation of sovereign immunity). Discretionary acts are "[t]hose acts wherein there is
no hard and fast rule as to. course of conduct that one must or must not take .... .
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 419 (5th ed. 1979). Discretionary acts require personal deliber-
ation, decision, and judgment. See Dunbar v. Fant, 170 S.C. 414, 421-22, 170 S.E. 460,
463 (1933).
138. Long, 260 S.C. at 568, 197 S.E.2d at 662. Ministerial duties are "absolute, cer-
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gives rise to liability.
The court of appeals held that the county DSS officials and em-
ployees owed Michael Clark a ministerial duty to conduct a thorough
investigation. 139 Under the Act a social worker has no discretion to
carry out his required duties, which include the performance of a thor-
ough investigation of reported child abuse. The court recognized that
the manner in which a thorough investigation is carried out requires
the social worker to use some discretion. The court held, however, that
if the investigation was not thorough, then the social worker had
breached his ministerial duty.14 0 The court of appeals did not define
"thorough," but the court implies that if the social worker does not
make a home visit, his investigation will not be considered thorough.
Accordingly, the social worker would breach his ministerial duty under
the Act and be without the protection of official immunity.
Other courts have considered the issue of official immunity as it
applies to social workers. In Elton v. Orange County4 1 immunity was
not available to county employees for either the negligent placement of
a child in a foster home or for the failure to enforce and comply with
related regulations. 4 2 Relying on reasoning similar to that used by the
court of appeals in Jensen, the Elton court held that the actions by
county employees were not discretionary according to California stat-
utes, and, therefore, protection by immunity was not available.
4 3
The Jensen court held that county DSS employees and officials
have a special duty to investigate and to intervene in reported child
abuse cases. Additionally, these officials will not be shielded from lia-
bility by official immunity when they fail to make a thorough investiga-
tion. As a result, county DSS employees and officials will be subject to
liability for their negligent failure to remove potentially abused chil-
dren from dangerous home settings.
Johnathan T. Krawcheck
tan, and imperative, involving merely execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and
designated facts." Id.
139. Jensen, 297 S.C. at 332-33, 377 S.E.2d at 107-08. The Act requires an appropri-
ate and thorough investigation before a decision is made to close a file. See S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-7-650(C) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
140. Jensen, 297 S.C. at 333, 377 S.E.2d at 107-08.
141. 3 Cal. App. 3d 1053, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
142. Id. at 1058, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 30.
143. Id. at 1060, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
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V. FAMILY COURTS MUST USE CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES
In Miller v. Miller"4 the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed
a family court's reduction in a child support award. The supreme court
held that no substantial or material change in circumstances had oc-
curred to justify the family court's modification. In Miller the supreme
court used the South Carolina Child Support Guidelines (Guidelines)
to calculate the noncustodial father's support obligation, and found it
to be close to the amount awarded in the original Virginia support or-
der. The court then reinstated the Virginia order.145  -
Miller has an unusual procedural history. Maria and Christopher
Miller were divorced in Virginia in 1985. The Virginia court awarded
Mrs. Miller custody of their two minor children, and ordered Mr.
Miller to pay child support in the amount of $300 per month per child
and alimony in the amount of $300 per month. Mr. Miller had been
earning $50,000 annually until approximately one month before the fi-
nal hearing in Virginia when he was earning $1600 monthly."4 Mrs.
Miller was earning $5.90 per hour as a hospital clerk.
47
After the divorce Mr. Miller relocated to South Carolina and Mrs.
Miller moved with the two children into her parents' home in Pennsyl-
vania. When Mr. Miller failed to return the children to Pennsylvania
after their summer visit in August 1987, Mrs. Miller petitioned the
South Carolina Family Court for their return. In his answer Mr. Miller
requested a reduction in child support and other relief.4
8
The Lexington County Family Court found that a substantial
change in circumstances had occurred. Because Mr. Miller had not
been able to obtain employment in South Carolina at the same rate of
pay that he earned in Virginia, his income had decreased dramati-
cally.1 9 Conversely, Mrs. Miller had obtained a job in Pennsylvania at
a higher rate of pay than she had earned during the marriage and the
family's living expenses had decreased because they lived with Mrs.
Miller's parents. In an order filed February 23, 1988, the South Caro-
lina Family Court reduced Mr. Miller's monthly child support obliga-
tion; terminated alimony to Mrs. Miller, and required Mrs. Miller to
assist in summer visitation transportation. 50 Mrs. Miller appealed the
order.' 51
144. 299 S.C. 307, 384 S.E.2d 715 (1989).
145. Id. at 315, 384 S.E.2d at 719.
146. Id. at 309, 384 S.E.2d at 716.
147. Record at 105.
148. Miller, 299 S.C. at 309, 384 S.E.2d at 716.
149. See id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 310, 384 S.E.2d at 716 (1989). Mrs. Miller agreed to a termination of
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The supreme court affirmed the requirement that Mrs. Miller as-
sist in visitation transportation, but reversed the reduction of Mr.
Miller's child support obligation.182 The supreme court stated that
"[a]s there was no substantial or material change in circumstances, the
family court judge erred in modifying the child support award."' 53 A
family court judge may'modify a child support award if a party estab-
lishes a substantial or material change in circumstances, such as a
change in the supporting parent's ability to pay.'"' The supreme court
reasoned that the family court could justify the reduction of child sup-
port based on the decrease in Mr. Miller's income only if the court
assumed that the Virginia court based its support award on Mr.
Miller's income at his higher paying job. The Virginia court, however,
had documentation that reflected Mr. Miller's lower salary. Thus, the
supreme court refused to assume that the Virginia court failed to con-
sider this information in making the award, or that the parties had not
contemplated Mr. Miller's weakened financial condition at the time of
their divorce. 55
If a court finds a substantial or material change in circumstances,
it must review the facts and circumstances to make an appropriate ad-
justment in the support award. The Miller court stated that the factors
to be considered are "both parents' income, ability to pay, education,
expenses, and assets and the facts and circumstances surrounding each
case."' 6 The family court judge, however, relied solely on the Guide-
lines. The supreme court explained that even if a substantial or mate-
rial change in circumstances had occurred, the modification by the
family court was in error because it improperly calculated the child
support award under the Guidelines. 57 Although the Guidelines ex-
pressly provide that courts must add day care costs to the basic obliga-
tion,"'58 the family court failed to consider them. "Interestingly, when
the child support obligation is calculated properly under the Guide-
alimony in her testimony during the family court hearing, and appealed only the reduc-
tion in child support and the requirement that she assist with summer visitation trans-
portation. Id.
152. Id. at 314-15, 384 S.E.2d at 719.
153. Id. at 311, 384 S.E.2d at 717.
154. Id. at 310, 384 S.E.2d at 716-17.
155. See id. at 311, 384 S.E.2d at 717. The court stated that "changes in circum-
stances within the contemplation of the parties at the time the initial decree was entered
do not provide a basis for modifying a child support award." Id. at 310, 384 S.E.2d at 717
(citing Calvert v. Calvert, 287 S.C. 130, 336 S.E.2d 884 (Ct. App. 1985)); see also Nelson
v. Merritt, 281 S.C. 126, 314 S.E.2d 840 (Ct. App. 1984).
156. Miller, 299 S.C. at 312, 384 S.E.2d at 717.
157. Id. at 311, 384 S.E.2d at 717.
158. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES CHILD SUPPORT GUIELINES 6
(October 1987).
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lines, using Mr. Miller's present income, Mr. Miller's obligation is very
nearly the $600 per month he was originally ordered to pay by the Vir-
ginia Court."'159
The Miller court discussed the history of the Guidelines. In 1984
Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 667(a), 160 which requires states to estab-
lish child support guidelines. The guidelines had to be made available
to the states' judiciary and other officials, but the guidelines were not
"binding upon such judges or other.officials."''
1
In South Carolina the Guidelines were developed by the South
Carolina Child Support Guidelines Subcommittee of the Department
of Social Services (DSS) Child Support Advisory Committee. The Sub-
committee based the Guidelines on the Income Shares Model devel-
oped by the Child Support Guidelines Project (Project) of the National
Center for State Courts. DSS adopted the Guidelines and the Guide-
lines went into effect in October 1987.162
The Income Shares Model, one of the two guidelines the Project's
National Advisory panel recommended for adoption,163 is based on the
concept that a child should receive the same proportion of his parent's
income that he would have received if his parental household had re-
mained intact. 6 4 The Income Shares Model has been adopted in Colo-
rado, Maine, Michigan (in modified form), Nebraska, New Jersey, and
Vermont and is under consideration in several other states.16 5 Under
the Income Shares Model the average expenditures for children as a
percentage of both net and gross income are determined by the court's
evaluation of economic data. 16  A table constructed from the percent-
ages shows the amount of support that is due, and is based on the
number of children and the parents' combined income. Each parent's
portion of that obligation is prorated according to the percentage of
the combined income that each parent's income represents. Prorated
shares of extraordinary medical expenses and day care expenses also
are added to each parent's obligation. 167 The Income Shares Model
159. Miller, 299 S.C. at 314, 384 S.E.2d at 719.
160. (Supp. 1984).
161. Id. § 667(b).
162. Miller, 299 S.C. at 312, 384 S.E.2d at 718.
163. The other guideline is the Delaware Melson formula. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDELINES
FOR CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS: ADVISORY PANEL RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINAL REPORT
(1987) [hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR CHILD SUPPORT & ORDERS] pt. 2, 67 Ii.78, 80-81.
164. Id. at 67.
165. Id.; H. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 1057 (3d ed.
1990).
166. GUIDELINES FOR CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS, supra note 163, at 69-70. Net income
equals gross income minus federal and state taxes, FICA, and union dues. Id.
167. Id. at 75.
1990]
23
Maring et al.: Domestic Law
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
presumes that the custodial parent's obligation is spent directly on the
child. The noncustodial parent's obligation constitutes the child sup-
port amount to be awarded.
168
The following table is an example of a calculation of a child sup-
port award based on the Income Shares Model:1 9
INCOME SHARES GROSS INCOME FORMULA
(Two children living with Parent B)
Parent A Parent B Combined
(1) Annual Gross Income $18,000 $12,000 $30,000
(2) Monthly Gross Income 1,500 1,000 2,500
(3) Parental Income as 60% 40%
Proportion of Combined
(4) Basic Child Support $597*
Obligation
(5) Parental Shares of $358 $239
Obligation (line 4 times
line 3)
(6) Base Child Support $358 $239
(paid to B) (retained by B)
* Guidelines for Child Support Orders at 76.
Although the Income Shares Model was designed so that a child is
"insulated from the lowered living standard resulting from the dissolu-
tion (or non-formation),' 17 0 of the household, the Final Report of the
Project concedes that no approach can guarantee that a child will not
suffer a reduction in his standard of living. This is particularly true
because "the child support allocation, without reference to spousal
maintenance, does not equalize the relative incomes of the two house-
holds. 171 In 1988 Congress enacted Public Law 100-485, which re-
quires the states to adopt mandatory child support guidelines. Con-
gress deleted the clause from 42 U.S.C. § 667, which stated that the
guidelines need not be binding, and added the following language:
There shall be a rebuttable presumption ... that the amount of the
award which would result from the application of such guidelines is
the correct amount of child support to-be awarded. A written finding
or specific finding ... that the application of the guidelines would be
168. Id. at 68. The Income Shares Model incorporates a self-support reserve for the
obligor and also has different formulas for unusual custody arrangements. Id. at 73, 79.
169. Id. at 76.
170. Id. at 68.
171. Id. at 69.
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unjust or inappropriate. shall be sufficient to rebut the presump-
tion .... 172
The South Carolina Legislature responded to this congressional
mardate with South Carolina Code section 20-7-852, which requires
the application of the Guidelines absent a showing "that application
in a particular case would be unjust or inappropriate. 1 7' 3 Thus,
when a court deviates from the Guidelines, it must present written
findings of fact on which it bases its conclusion.17"
In the last legislative session the South Carolina General Assembly
approved the DSS guidelines, and they became effective on May 25,
1990.175 The regulations incorporate by reference the Guidelines'
schedule and worksheets. The regulations also allow the courts to devi-
ate from the Guidelines in the event of lump sum, rehabilitative, or
reimbursement alimony, 17 and in joint custody situations. The Guide-
lines, however, do not consider the economic impact of certain factors
that are listed in the regulations, such as voluntary child support from
another relationship, educational expenses for the children, and con-
sumer debts.
177
The South Carolina Legislature and courts have traditionally left
the award and amount of child support to the discretion of the trial
judge. 17 Prior to the development of the Guidelines discussed above,
Graham v. Graham179 set forth the principal support guideline for the
judiciary. 8 '
The amount of alimony and child support cannot be determined by
any mathematical formula but is a matter resting within the sound
discretion of the trial judge. . . . In arriving at the amount of alimony
and child support, the trial judge should take into consideration the
needs of the wife and child and the financial ability of the husband
and father to meet them, considering his income and assets.. . . It is
also proper to consider the husband's necessities and living expenses
in fixing the amount of alimony and child support. The amount of the
award for alimony and child support should not be excessive but
172. 42 U.S.C. § 667(b), as amended by Act of Oct. 13, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485,
tit. I, § 103(a), (b), (f), 102 Stat. 2346, 2348 (1988).
173. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-852 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
174. Id.
175. S.C. Reg., Vol. 14. No. 6, pp. 149-55 (May 25, 1990).
176. Id. at 150 (regulation 114-47-10C).
177. Id. at 149-50 (regulation 114-47-10).
178. See, e.g., Thornton v. Thornton, 294 S.C. 512, 514, 366 S.E.2d 37, 39 (Ct. App.
1988); Perkins v. Parkins, 279 S.C. 508, 511, 309 S.E.2d 784, 786-87 (Ct. App. 1983),
179. 253 S.C. 486, 171 S.E.2d 704 (1970).
180. 1 R. CHASTAIN, THE LAW OF DoMEsTIc RELATIONS IN SOUTH CAROLINA 117
(1986).
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should be fair and just to all parties concerned.181
In Miller the South Carolina Supreme Court states that if the
Guidelines are applied to a particular case, the court must use them
correctly.18 2 The enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 667(a) and South Carolina
Code section 20-7-852(a), which made the advisory Guidelines
mandatory, has limited a significant power of the family court. The
Guidelines, however, promote judicial economy. The family court's use
of the Guidelines certainly will free court time, and parties who come
into the family court and seek child support awards generally will real-
ize their expectations. The mandatory nature of the Guidelines may
signal an uncertainty in this area, however, because practitioners now
only can speculate what will constitute a showing that a support award
is unjust or inappropriate in a particular case; and, furthermore, it may
prove difficult for lawyers to rebut the presumption that the mathe-
matical formulas of the Guidelines are correct.
Laura Eliza6eth Cude
VI. REIMBURSEMENT ALIMONY GRANTED TO SPOUSE WHO SUPPORTS
FAMILY WHILE OTHER SPOUSE OBTAINS A PROFESSIONAL DEGREE
In Donahue v. Donahue18 3 the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that a spouse who supports the family while the other spouse obtains a
professional degree or license may be entitled to reimbursement ali-
mony upon divorce. The court restricted its holding to the reimburse-
ment alimony award and stated that "a professional degree is not mar-
ital property and is therefore not subject to equitable distribution.
1 8 4
The Donahues were married less than a year when Mr. Donahue
entered dental school. Mrs. Donahue supported the family until her
husband completed dental school and opened his practice. The couple
divorced approximately four years after the husband opened his prac-
tice. The court valued the marital estate at over $270,000 and found
that the wife's contribution to the estate was ninety-one percent. 8
In Donahue the court decided that the appropriateness of reim-
bursement alimony should be determined independently of a tradi-
tional alimony analysis. 8 The court stated:
181. Graham, 253 S.C. at 491-92, 171 S.E.2d at 707 (citations omitted).
182. Miller, 299 S.C. at 314, 384 S.E.2d at 719.
183. 299 S.C. 353, 384 S.E.2d 741 (1989).
184. Id. at 358, 384 S.E.2d at 744. The court noted that they were concerned with
the husband's dental practice and not with his degree. See id.
185. Id. at 356-57, 361, 384 S.E.2d at 743, 745-46.
186. Id. at 364, 384 S.E.2d at 747; see also Hoak v. Hoak, 370 S.E.2d 473 (W. Va.
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Generally, the contribution of one spouse to the education of the
other spouse may be taken into account by giving the supporting
spouse a larger distributive share of the marital property to be di-
vided. This remedy is not, however, sufficient when little or no marital
property has been accumulated during the marriage.187
A traditional alimony analysis also may be inadequate or unavailable
when the parties are divorced before the benefits of the professional
degree are realized.' 8
When the Donahue court adopted reimbursement alimony, it re-
fused to apply a "strict financial approach" and opted for the "all rele-
vant factors approach."'' 89 The court described the strict financial
formula as follows: "[W]orking spouse's financial contribution to joint
living expenses and educational costs of student spouse less 1/2 (work-
ing spouse's financial contributions plus student spouse's financial con-
tributions less cost of education) equals equitable award to working
spouse."' 0 The court specifically considered as a relevant factor the
money paid by the supporting spouse for the support of the parties'
children, but left to the trial court's discretion the final determination
of the amount of any reimbursement alimony to be awarded based on
"all relevant factors."' 9' Other jurisdictions have considered the
amount expended in support of the family and the future value of the
degree to determine the amount of reimbursement alimony, even
though the courts characterized a professional degree as nonmarital
property. 92
Reimbursement alimony differs from traditional alimony not only
in the. basis for its award 93 and in the factors used to compute the
1988) (allowed reimbursement alimony when a share of the marital property would not
compensate supporting spouse).
187. Id. at 363, 384 S.E.2d at 747.
188. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Francis, 442 N.W.2d 59 (Iowa 1989) (excellent dis-
cussion of all issues that surround reimbursement alimony).
189. See Donahue, 299 S.C. at 363-64, 384 S.E.2d at 747-48.
190. Id. at 364, 384 S.E.2d at 747.
191. Id. at 364-65, 384 S.E.2d at 747-48.
192. See, e.g., Stevens v. Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d 115, 492 N.E.2d 131 (1986) (veteri-
nary degree). The Donahue court did not address the issue of the future value of Mr.
Donahue's dental degree. The court, however, reversed the trial court's ruling that
placed a value on the dental practice for purposes of equitable division. The Donahue
court held that the only value in a solo professional practice is goodwill, but that good-
will is not subject to equitable division because of its speculative nature. 299 S.C. at 360,
384 S.E.2d at 745. See also Casey v. Casey, 293 S.C. 503, 362 S.E.2d 6 (1987) (goodwill in
fireworks business was too speculative to determine because it was dependent on owner's
home earnings).'
193. Traditional alimony is based on need, whereas reimbursement alimony is based
on a right that arises from the expectation of a fair return on the supporting spouse's
investment. Comment, Professional Licenses and Marital Dissolution in O'Brien v.
1990]
27
Maring et al.: Domestic Law
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
amount of the award, but also in its duration and termination. Al-
though the Donahue court did not address the issues of duration and
termination, other courts have held that reimbursement alimony ter-
minates only upon the death of the payee spouse.194 In other jurisdic-
tions reimbursement alimony generally continues for a specific period
of time regardless of the remarriage of the payee spouse. 195 In Donahue
the supreme court significantly changed South Carolina law when it
provided for reimbursement alimony. Still, the meaning of "all relevant
factors," the duration of reimbursement alimony, and the conditions
for its termination, remain unanswered questions in South Carolina af-
ter Donahue.196
Frances C. Trapp
O'Brien: Expectation Returns in the Marital Partnership, 72 IOWA L. Rv. 445 (1984).
194. In re Marriage of Francis, 442 N.W.2d 59, 64 (Iowa 1989).
195. Id.; see also Comment, supra note 193, at 452-53.
196. On May 29, 1990, Governor Campbell approved an amendment to S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-3-130 (Law. Co-op. 1976), which codifies Donahue and provides conditions for
termination of reimbursement alimony.
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